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LIMDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT BONN 15537 ACTION DEPT INFO LONDON OCT 2ND

QUOTE

S E C R E T BONN 15537

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: CONVENTIONAL BALANCE: BONN TRILATERAL MEETING

1. US, UK, AND FRG DELEGATIONS MET IN BONN SEPTEMBER 12 TO DISCUSS THE NATO/WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL MILITARY BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. DELEGATIONS WERE HEADED BY ISA DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BERGOLD, BRIGADIER GENERAL FURSDON AND ADMIRAL TREBESCH. THE DELEGATES FOCUSED ON THE POLITICAL-MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE BALANCE RATHER THAN LOOKING AT STRICTLY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES.

2. BOTH THE BRITISH AND GERMANS OBJECTED TO A FORMAL
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STRUCTURE FOR THE MEETING. THE GERMANS IN PARTICULAR

WERE LOATH TO FORM ADDITIONAL WORKING GROUPS, STUDY GROUPS, ETC. ALL DELEGATIONS MADE THE POINT THAT THE SUSPICIONS OF OTHER ALLIANCE MEMBERS SHOULD NOT BE AROUSED THAT THE "BIG THREE" WERE DOING SOMETHING SURREPTITIOUSLY. THE BRITISH WERE CONCERNED ABOUT TREADING ON TOES IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S WORK ON THE OFFICIAL MILITARY ESTIMATE OF THE WARSAW PACT (MC 161).

3. BERGOLD SAID THE GROUP SHOULD HAVE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS ONLY, AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED PART OF THE NATO MACHINERY. HE MADE THE POINT THAT A FINAL PAPER ABOUT THE MEETING WAS NOT IMPORTANT; THE SPIRIT OF THE DISCUSSIONS WAS WHAT REALLY COUNTED. HE SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO FORMAL CONNECTION WITH EITHER THE MC 161 OR MCSSG GROUPS. RATHER, THE PURPOSE WAS TO TRY TO IDENTIFY AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL WORK, WHICH SHOULD BE BASED ON HARD MILITARY DATA CONTRIBUTING TO A REALISTIC NET ASSESSMENT OF NATO-WARSAW PACT CAPABILITIES. ANY NEW INSIGHTS DERIVED FROM SUCH AN ASSESSMENT WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN NATIONAL LEGISLATURES. ONLY THE US, UK AND FRG HAD THE ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY TO UNDERTAKE SUCH WORK.

4. DR. HENRY GAFFNEY, DOD/OSD, MADE A PRESENTATION CONCERNING A NEW LONG-RANGE DEFENSE CONCEPT FOR NATO (GAFFNEY HAD JUST MADE A FORMAL PRESENTATION IN NATO REGARDING US PROPOSALS FOR NEW MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE). HE SAID THE NEW LONG-RANGE DEFENSE CONCEPT FALLS WITHIN THE PARAMETERS OF AGREED NATO STRATEGY SET FORTH IN MC 14/3. THE US WANTS FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN THE FALL ON THE UNDERLYING CONCEPTS. GAFFNEY SAID THE BASIC PROPOSITION OF THE US DOCUMENT WAS THAT NATO IS PRETTY GOOD NOW AND HAS A STRONG DETERRENT, ALTHOUGH EFFORTS ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE EXISTING SITUATION, FOR EXAMPLE, BY UPGRADING ANTI-TANK DEFENSES. THE US ANALYSIS FLOWS FROM A MORE POSITIVE VIEW OF THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE THAN PREVIOUSLY SET FORTH IN NATO DOCUMENTS. GAFFNEY POINTED OUT THAT THE WARSAW PACT MUST MASS BEFORE AN ATTACK WHETHER BY LAND OR SEA. HE

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MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF SHIFTING RESOURCES FROM TAIL TO TEETH. HE EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT NATO WOULD HAVE APPROPRIATE WARNING TIME PRIOR TO A WARSAW PACT ATTACK. HE INTRODUCED THE NOTION THAT THE US COULD REINFORCE AS FAST AS THE SOVIET UNION.

5. THE BRITISH AND GERMANS WERE RELUCTANT TO STRAY VERY FAR FROM MC 161. THE BRITISH MADE THE POINT THAT THE

MCSSG WAS SUPPOSED TO BE WORKING IN AREAS GAFFNEY HAD DESCRIBED. THE AMERICAN SIDE POINTED OUT THAT THE RESULTS OF THE MCSSG WORK WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR SOME TIME. SECRETARY SCHLESINGER WOULD LIKE TO SEE A CONSENSUS FORMED BY CHRISTMAS REGARDING A NEW LONG-RANGE DEFENSE CONCEPT FOR NATO.

6. A DISCUSSION ENSUED AS TO WHAT A REVISED NET ASSESSMENT MIGHT MEAN FOR NATO'S PUBLIC POSTURE AS WELL AS TO ITS IMPACT IN NATIONAL LEGISLATURES. THE BRITISH POINTED OUT THAT AN ESTIMATED WEAKENED WARSAW PACT THREAT MIGHT MEAN LOWER DEFENSE BUDGETS, AND DEFENSE MINISTERS MIGHT LOSE OUT IN THE BATTLE FOR FUNDS. THE US VIEW WAS THAT THE ESTIMATES SHOULD BE WORKED OUT IN SECRET AND THEN A DECISION TAKEN AS TO WHAT TO SAY PUBLICLY.

7. TURNING TO ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF DEFENSE, BERGOLD INDICATED THIS MIGHT BE A FRUITFUL AREA FOR ADDITIONAL WORK. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY UNDER A SOVIET ATTACK? WOULD EUROPE BE FACED WITH ECONOMIC COLLAPSE? COULD THE WAR EFFORT BE SUPPORTED? THE GERMANS SAID THEY WERE CURRENTLY STUDYING THIS PROBLEM AND WOULD BE HAPPY TO MAKE THEIR WORK AVAILABLE TO THE US AND UK.

8. THE GERMANS DISCUSSED MC 161 AT LENGTH. THEY BELIEVE NO OTHER CONCLUSIONS ARE POSSIBLE BASED UPON WARSAW PACT CAPABILITIES. THEY QUESTIONED THE IDEA THAT THE US HAS THE ABILITY TO REINFORCE FASTER THAN THE SOVIETS. THE BRITISH SUPPORTED THE GERMANS IN THIS VIEW. IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT PART OF MC 161 WAS BEING REWRITTEN TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE
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WEAKNESSES AS WELL AS THE STRENGTHS OF THE WARSAW PACT. GAFFNEY SAID THAT MC 161 WAS PROBABLY CORRECT IN ITS ASSESSMENT OF THE RELIABILITY OF THE WARSAW PACT STATES. THE US ASSUMPTION IS THAT ALL COUNTRIES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE LINE ARE RELIABLE, BUT THE US, GAFFNEY SAID, IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE COLLECTIVE NATURE OF THE NATO DECISION-MAKING PROCESS. DELEGATIONS AGREED THAT THE QUESTION OF WARSAW PACT RELIABILITY SHOULD BE KEPT ON THE TABLE FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION.

9. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE AGREED SUMMARY RECORD OF THE MEETING. BEGIN TEXT:

SUMMARY RECORD ON TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS

1. AT AN INFORMAL MEETING HELD IN BONN ON 12/13 SEPTEMBER 1974 DELEGATIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY DISCUSSED CERTAIN TOPICS RELEVANT TO THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE. THE INFORMAL AGENDA IS ATTACHED.

2. IT WAS NOTED THAT

A. ON CERTAIN OF THESE TOPICS ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN IN THE FIRST INSTANCE DURING THE MC 161 REVISION DISCUSSIONS, ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT ALSO BE FURTHER DISCUSSED TRILATERALLY AS APPROPRIATE;

B. ON OTHERS THERE WOULD BE MATERIAL FOR FURTHER TRILATERAL DISCUSSION, ALTHOUGH IN SOME CASES (E.G. THE CAPABILITY OF THE WARSAW PACT TO ATTACK AT VARIOUS STAGES OF MOBILIZATION) IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF MORE DETAILED PAPERS WERE TO BE EXCHANGED;

C. ON THE PARTICULAR QUESTION OF NATO'S USE OF WARNING TIME THE US WOULD PURSUE THEIR DPC PROPOSAL FOR A SPECIFIC NATO STUDY, WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE UK AND FRG; AND

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D. THE FRG OFFERED TO SHARE WITH THE OTHER TWO NATIONS CERTAIN WORK ON THE LIKELY EFFECTS OF A WP ATTACK ON THE ECONOMY OF WESTERN EUROPE.

3. IT WAS AGREED THAT SUCH INFORMAL TRILATERAL AD HOC DISCUSSIONS WERE USEFUL AS A MEANS OF SECURING GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF AREAS OF AGREEMENTS AS WELL AS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NATIONAL POSITIONS. THEY COULD NOT REPLACE BUT SHOULD ASSIST THE CONTINUING DISCUSSION IN THE APPROPRIATE FORMAL NATO MACHINERY (E.G. THE MC SSG).

4. IT WAS NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT THE US DELEGATION OFFERED TO HOST A FURTHER MEETING AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME IN WASHINGTON. END TEXT.

10. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AGENDA. BEGIN TEXT:

A. OPENING REMARKS RADM TREBESCH

B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS

C. SELECTION OF POSSIBLE SUBJECTS ON THE BASIS OF THE

US PROPOSAL

1. POLITICAL-MILITARY SOLIDARITY IN NATO-WARSAW PACT.

A. WHAT POLITICAL-MILITARY PROBLEMS EXIST IN WP AND NATO TO INCLUDE RELIABILITY OF MILITARY FORCES.

B. ECONOMIC ASPECTS.

2. WARSAW PACT CONCEPT FOR STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (GROUND, SEA AND AIR). (PRIMARY CONSIDERATIONS TO CENTRAL REGION, BUT NOT TO THE EXCLUSION OF MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS OF FLANKS AND MARITIME FORCES.)

A. WHAT SCALE OF WP ATTACK WOULD BE POSSIBLE BEFORE MOBILIZATION IS COMPLETE?

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B. WHAT USE COULD NATO MAKE OF THE WARNING TIME AVAILABLE?

3. MOBILIZATION CAPABILITY OF WP-NATO.

A. ASSESSMENT OF TIMES FOR MOBILIZATION UNITS TO REACH VARIOUS LEVELS OF EFFECTIVENESS.

B. ASSESSMENT OF MOBILIZED UNITS - CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT ACTIVE FORCES IN SUSTAINED OPERATIONS.

4. PROBLEMS OF WP-NATO LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS.

5. ASSESSMENT OF WARNING TIMES BASED ON THESE CONSIDERATIONS.

D. ELABORATION OF THE "TERMS OF REFERENCE" FOR THE SELECTED SUBJECTS

E. FURTHER WORKING PROGRAMME

F. ANY OTHER BUSINESS END TEXT
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